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107 
HISTORICAL HEIST: 
AN ECONOMIC ARGUMENT AGAINST 
EMBARGOING CHINESE CULTURAL PROPERTY 
“Art is not a mirror held up to reality, but a hammer with which to 
shape it.”1 
—Vladimir Mayakovsky 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, Time reported on a virulently rampant problem, touching both 
the silken aristocrat and the lowly peasant. A persistent threat to the 
memory of human civilization and yet the key to its everlasting sanctum. 
On a damp, portentous evening in 1997, in the center of a wheatfield, 
edging the crumbling villages near Luoyang in China’s Henan province, a 
man named Feng made a decision that would have international 
reverberations.2  
Feng, then nineteen years old, became a tomb raider that night. After 
drinking sorghum spirits with a group of friends and fellow raiders, the 
group set out for a local wheatfield. The men quickly located what 
appeared to be an unmarked tomb by using a small generator to provide 
light in the late hour. After digging for a short while, stale air began 
emanating from the freshly uncovered tomb, leaving Feng nauseous yet 
determined to continue. At least one of the men standing nearby staggered 
away and promptly vomited from the stench. Feng stood over the exposed 
pit, staring down into the tomb’s inky depths. Just as his nerves began to 
falter, Feng’s uncle approached him, explaining that as the youngest of the 
group, Feng would have the honor of descending into the tomb on a solo 
reconnaissance mission—an initiation rite.3  
Feng descended deep into the cavernous sepulcher using only rope as a 
guide. Heavy air, paralyzed by time’s stillness, blossomed through the 
descent. Upon reaching the floor, however, the fumes became 
overwhelming. Feng wallowed in the stench, gasping for air before finally 
fainting. Despite having to drag him out, the other raiders recovered five 
 
 
 1. THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 32 (1989) (citing THE GUARDIAN (London), 
Dec. 11, 1974). 
 2. Hannah Beech, Spirited Away, TIME (Asia Edition), Oct. 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/501031020/story.html. 
 3. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:107 
 
 
 
 
ceramic Tang Dynasty animals, each worth around ten thousand dollars to 
Western dealers. Despite his ignominious maiden raid, Feng was paid 
forty-five dollars as his share of the profit. He does not know why 
Westerners pay so handsomely for such a dingy piece of pottery, and does 
not care, so long as he is paid.4  
II. CHINA’S MIGHTY REQUEST 
Feng’s story is not unique. According to China’s National Cultural 
Relics Bureau, approximately 220,000 ancient tombs in China were 
breached and looted between 1998 and 2003.5 China has an epidemic on 
its hands, and under its soil. 
Thus, on May 27, 2004, the People’s Republic of China formally 
requested that the U.S. Department of State restrict the importation of 
Chinese archaeological material from the Paleolithic period to the Qing 
Dynasty due to a concern that Chinese cultural heritage is under attack 
from pillage.6 The request stirred tremendous debate in the U.S. art 
community. It sought to render illegal the importation of certain categories 
of metal implements; weapons; vessels; sculpture; jewelry; pottery and 
porcelain vessels; architectural elements; stone implements; lacquer, bone, 
ivory and horn wares; and wood and bamboo objects, among others.7 Art 
dealers, museum curators, collectors, and art enthusiasts focused their 
attention on the State Department to see how it would manage the 
request.8 These individuals were well aware that the United States had 
 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Public Summary, Request of the People’s Republic of China to the Government of the United 
States of America Under Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, available at http://exchanges. 
state.gov/culprop/cn04sum.html [hereinafter Public Summary]. In this public summary, the Chinese 
government argues that the “[p]illage of archaeological sites and smuggling of cultural artifacts . . . has 
become rampant in recent years despite the law enforcement efforts of the Chinese government.” Id. 
The summary indicates that China has attempted to solve the problem, but is in need of U.S. assistance 
if there is to be any marked improvement in the situation. The summary also provides a brief history of 
pillage and looting in China since the mid-nineteenth century. China acknowledges the world-wide 
popularity and high prices of Chinese archaeological artifacts and attributes this to the illegal 
excavation and smuggling of cultural property. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Randy Kennedy, China’s Request for Art-Import Ban Stirs Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2005, at E31. Prominent archaeologists, preservationists, and scholars lined up to support the Chinese 
government, in opposition to antiquities dealers and museum officials who staunchly opposed the 
request. Opposition leaders argued that any change would be unfair, ineffective in preventing looting, 
and devastating for the art market and museums. Furthermore, they argued that the United States 
represents only a small part of a thriving international market for Chinese antiquities. Emphasizing the 
growing demand among wealthy collectors in China itself, the group argued that China has not 
fulfilled its obligations to protect its own cultural patrimony. Id. 
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previously approved import restrictions with nations rich in antiquities, in 
an attempt to curb the export of illicit cultural property. However, China’s 
request came amid a turbo-charged international market that was 
aggressively collecting Chinese cultural artifacts.9  
Procedurally, following an initial petition for U.S. import restrictions 
on cultural property, the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (“CPAC”) 
is granted time to review the request.10 The Committee’s findings are then 
passed on to a decision-maker in the State Department. This person later 
confers with officials in the White House and Treasury Department and 
makes a final decision on the import restriction.11 
The CPAC held a public hearing on February 17, 2005, to debate the 
issue,12 then discussed it again in closed session on March 31 and April 1 
of the same year.13 The Committee was to determine whether the Chinese 
request satisfied the four requirements of the U.S. legislation 
implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention (the “Convention”),14 
appropriately named the Convention on Cultural Property Act (“CPIA”).15 
 
 
 9. Michael Wise, China Urges U.S. to Embargo Import of Cultural Artifacts: A Chilling Effect, 
ART & AUCTION MAG., Jan. 2006, at 28, 28–30.  
 10. Steven Vincent, The Secret War of Maria Kouroupas, ART & AUCTION MAG., Mar. 2002, at 
62. Following a decade long debate, the U.S. Congress implemented numerous provisions from the 
1970 UNESCO Convention. These provisions appeared in the form of the Cultural Properties 
Implementation Act (“CPIA”), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2000), sponsored by Senators Spark 
Matsunaga of Hawaii and Robert Dole of Kansas. The CPAC was designed to be the first step in a 
process by which source nations could request U.S. bans on the importation of certain types of 
archaeological material from within their borders. The CPAC is composed of eleven members. These 
members are appointed by the President and advise the State Department when countries request art 
import restrictions. Under the CPIA, the CPAC is to be composed of two members representing the 
interests of museums; three members who are experts in the fields of archaeology, anthropology, 
ethnology, or related areas; three members who are experts in the international sale of archaeological, 
ethnological, and other cultural property; and three members who represent the general public. 19 
U.S.C. § 2605. 
 11. Vincent, supra note 10, at 65. Import restrictions are enforced by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, which falls under the Department of Homeland Security. Initially, the decision-makers 
were members of the United States Information Agency (USIA), but in 1999, this agency was 
subsumed into the State Department. 
 12. Although the CPAC held a public debate on the issue of Chinese import restrictions, it should 
be noted that there was but one public hearing and participants’ remarks were limited to five minutes 
each. This raised concerns among all groups, including the curators, auction houses, and dealers, as to 
the transparency of the State Department’s deliberations. Jeremy Kahn, U.S. Delays Rule on Limits to 
Chinese Art Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at E2. 
 13. Inbal Baum, The Great Mall of China: Should the United States Restrict Importation of 
Chinese Cultural Property?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 919, 944 (2006). 
 14. See Jane Warring, Underground Debates: The Fundamental Differences of Opinion That 
Thwart UNESCO’s Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 19 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 227, 236 (2005). 
 15. Under § 2605(f), the CPAC must undertake an investigation of the request and prepare a 
report noting its recommendation together with the reasons for that recommendation. These reports are 
to be filed with both Congress and the President. 
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If it were determined that the Chinese request failed to satisfy these four 
requirements, the request would be denied.16 If, conversely, the request 
were found to have satisfied the CPIA requirements, the United States 
would theoretically have little reason to stall the implementation of import 
restrictions. Thus, the heated public debate of February 17, 2005, centered 
on these four requirements. 
Under the CPIA, the President must make the following four 
determinations: (1) that the cultural patrimony of the other member state is 
in jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials of 
the other member state; (2) that the other member state has taken measures 
consistent with the Convention to protect its own cultural heritage; (3) that 
any import restrictions would be of substantial benefit in deterring a 
serious situation of pillage, and that there are no alternative, less drastic 
remedies than an import restriction; and (4) that import restrictions are 
consistent with the general interest of the international community in the 
interchange of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural, and 
educational purposes.17 In short, the President must determine that cultural 
property is in danger, that the other state took sufficient actions to protect 
its cultural property, that import restrictions would be beneficial and not 
overly restrictive, and finally that there exists a general international 
interest in restricting the importation of the antiquities in question. 
CPAC members were inundated with letters from both those in favor of 
and against import restrictions. Those opposing China’s request observed 
that it included some categories that are not considered “archaeological” 
materials, are not over 250 years old, and are not normally found beneath 
the ground.18 Furthermore, they insisted that no other market nations have 
implemented similar restrictions on the importation of Chinese antiquities, 
a necessary requirement of the CPIA.19 The opposition also argued that 
 
 
 16. Vincent, supra note 10, at 64. Meredith Palmer worked as a cultural officer at the State 
Department in the 1970s with other pioneers in the cultural patrimony field. She helped develop the 
legal and intellectual framework for the CPIA legislation. She says of the people who crafted the CPIA 
legislation, “we took great pains to ensure that any law based on the UNESCO Convention reflected 
the broad interests of the American people.” Id. Later, she notes, “we had no intention of giving 
foreign nations a blank check to demand blanket protections.” Id. 
 17. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1). 
 18. William G. Pearlstein, People’s Republic of China, Request for Import Restrictions on 
Certain Cultural Materials, Comments of William G. Pearlstein to Cultural Property Advisory 
Committee (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.golenbock.com/pub-s.htm. Under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2601(2)(C)(i), “no object may be considered an object of archaeological interest unless such object 
(I) is of cultural significance; (II) is at least two hundred and fifty years old; and (III) was normally 
discovered as a result of scientific excavation, clandestine or accidental digging, or exploration on land 
or under water.” 
 19. Both the opposition and supporters of the import restrictions obfuscate the issue here. Under 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss1/4
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China has not met its burden of satisfying the CPIA’s “self-help” 
requirements.20  
Conversely, those in favor of import restrictions argued that China has 
a continually expanding legal regime to protect its cultural property, thus 
satisfying its obligations under the CPIA.21 Supporters of these restrictions 
further argued that the five largest markets for Chinese cultural property 
have implemented domestic legislation automatically banning importation 
of restricted cultural materials from other states party to the Convention.22 
Even barring similar foreign legislation, they argued, the President 
nevertheless retains the power to implement import restrictions under an 
exception to the CPIA requirements.23 Despite the rhetoric of these two 
groups and the escalating black market for Chinese cultural property, no 
State Department decision has been issued to date.24 
This Article will address China’s request for U.S. support under the 
CPIA. Part III will assess the four distinct requirements under the CPIA 
and address China’s failure to comply with three of the four. Part III.C is 
the heart of this argument. In it, an economic analysis will prove that a 
U.S. embargo on Chinese cultural property will not deter the ongoing 
pillage of China’s cultural property. Structurally, this argument is designed 
to show that an embargo will likely increase this pillage. Let it be clear—
 
 
the CPIA, agreements can take two forms—both contained in Memoranda of Understanding. Both are 
intended to provide limited, accountable, and temporary protection for cultural property. The first 
agreement is called an “emergency” restriction. These restrictions are applied to situations in which 
looting is especially dire or in which the sites and objects are of “high cultural significance.” Countries 
can obtain “emergency” restrictions without demonstrating that other governments are undertaking 
similar policies. These last for five years, but can later be extended in three-year periods. The second 
type of agreement is called a “bilateral” agreement. The bilateral agreements are intended to cover a 
much broader range of objects that do not necessarily have a “high” significance. Unlike emergency 
restrictions, bilateral agreements are only implemented when the requesting nation has shown that 
similar restrictions are imposed by other market nations. Bilateral agreements last for five years, and 
can be extended in five-year periods. China has not specifically sought a “bilateral” agreement—it has 
merely requested aid under the CPIA in the form of import restrictions. As such, arguing either that 
China has or has not proven other nations are enacting similar restrictions is a moot point. See, e.g., 
Vincent, supra note 10, at 65. 
 20. Pearlstein, supra note 18. 
 21. Letter from Patty Gerstenblith, President, Lawyers’ Comm. for Cultural Pres., to Mr. Jay 
Kislak, Chair of CPAC (Feb. 4, 2005), available at http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/archaeology 
watch/China/Gerstenblith_CPACChinaLetter.pdf. 
 22. Id. See also supra note 19. 
 23. Id. Under 19 U.S.C. § 2602(c)(2), the President still has the power to implement the bilateral 
agreement restricting importation of Chinese cultural property if he or she feels that U.S. restrictions 
are essential to deter a serious situation of pillage, even though other nations are not likely to 
implement their own restrictions. 
 24. The CPAC was slated to have a closed door meeting on October 4–5, 2007. China still has a 
pending request for import restrictions, so it would be a good bet that China was discussed at this 
meeting. However, as of November 9, 2008, no decision has yet been publicly issued. 
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this author is deeply concerned for the heritage of mankind and wishes in 
no way to deter the international community from focusing on solutions to 
this problem. Rather, it is hoped that this small contribution will 
meaningfully enlighten the ongoing discussion, such that other possible 
remedies will both be acknowledged and studied. 
III. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REJECT CHINA’S PROPOSED IMPORT 
RESTRICTION 
The United States should reject the proposed Chinese import 
restrictions because China has failed to meet its burden under the CPIA. 
Concededly, China’s cultural patrimony is in jeopardy of pillage. 
However, despite the foreseeable and irreparable harm to China’s cultural 
heritage, China has not taken adequate measures to protect her own 
cultural heritage under the Convention, and may even be said to have 
breached the spirit of the Convention. Furthermore, the proposed import 
restrictions will not be of substantial benefit in deterring the pillage of 
cultural property. Lastly, China’s proposed import restrictions are overly 
broad, such that the proposal may be deemed inconsistent with the general 
interest of the international community in the interchange of cultural 
property for scientific, cultural, and educational purposes. 
A. China’s Cultural Patrimony Is Under Threat 
To fully understand the current threat to Chinese cultural heritage, it is 
important first to understand a little about the international market in illicit 
cultural property.25 In this market, nations are generally classified as either 
“source nations” or “market nations.” The simplest way of distinguishing 
between a source nation and a market nation is this: if the supply of 
desirable cultural property exceeds the internal demand, the nation is 
considered a source nation.26 If, however, the demand exceeds the supply, 
 
 
 25. The terms “cultural heritage” and “cultural property” will be used interchangeably 
throughout this Note. Traditionally the term “cultural property” has been used to describe objects of 
“artistic, archaeological, ethnological or historical interest [that are] components of a common human 
culture, whatever their places of origin or present location, independent of property rights or national 
jurisdiction.” John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 831, 831 (1986). Recently, however, the term “cultural heritage” has been employed due to its 
ability to convey a culture’s connection to its past heritage, rather than mere property rights. This 
change was in part brought about by the 1970 UNESCO Convention’s focus on cultural nationalism—
the view that antiquities are bound up with their place of creation—as opposed to cultural 
internationalism. Id. at 842–45. 
 26. Id. at 832. Source nations typically have extensive human occupational histories, which 
account for their substantial abundance of cultural property. 
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the nation is considered a market nation.27 Mexico, Egypt, Greece, and 
India are examples of source nations, whereas the United States, France, 
and Germany are famous examples of market nations.28 Inevitably, the 
demand for antiquities from market nations encourages illicit export from 
source nations. This trend is even more pronounced when the source 
nation is relatively poor and the market nation is relatively wealthy.29 
The United States is a major market for the purchase of antiquities that 
have been illegally excavated and exported from China.30 Figures for the 
looting are jaw dropping. For instance, “China’s State Bureau of Cultural 
Relics estimates that over 220,000 tombs have been robbed since 1998.”31 
Some estimates place that number at around four hundred thousand in the 
past twenty-five years.32  
Exemplifying this black market journey from in situ to insidious 
auction is the story of the Wang Chuzi marble reliefs. In 1994, twelve men 
used explosives to breach the outer walls of the tomb of Wang Chuzi, a 
 
 
 27. Id. Likewise, nations that meet the description of a market nation tend to be industrialized, 
modern, wealthy nations whose citizens have enough disposable income to support an interest in 
collecting (generally valuable) antiquities.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Kennedy, supra note 8. Several high profile cases of illicit Chinese cultural property have 
fueled concerns that the United States is a major threat to China’s cultural heritage. In 2000, customs 
officials reported on the seizure of a tenth-century marble relief panel that had been stolen from an 
ancient tomb and was slated to be sold at Christie’s. See also Michael L. Dutra, Sir, How Much Is That 
Ming Vase in the Window?: Protecting Cultural Relics in the People’s Republic of China, 5 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 62, 63 (2004). 
 31. Dutra, supra note 30, at 63. China’s State Bureau of Cultural Relics is an administrative 
organ under the Ministry of Culture in charge of relics and museum work in China. Its major tasks are 
to:  
research and make principles, policies, regulations and plans for relics and museum 
development, and stipulate and carry out related systems; instruct and coordinate relics 
management, protection, save [sic], excavation, research, publicity, and going abroad; 
examine and report key state relics protection departments; be in charge of examining and 
reporting historical cultural cities and work [sic] cultural legacy projects; examine or approve 
the excavation, protection and maintenance of key state relics; instruct the construction of big 
museums and cooperation and exchanges among museums; research and handle significant 
problems in relics protection; research and stipulate management methods of relics 
circulation; approve the establishment and cancellation of institutions engaging in export 
appraisal of relics; make budget for relics protection funds and examine, allocate and 
supervise the funds; train relics and museum personnel; organize and instruct research of 
relics protection and museums; administrate [sic] and instruct foreign affairs work and carry 
out cooperation and exchanges; and do other work handed over by the State Council and the 
Ministry of Culture.  
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Culture (Oct. 18, 
2004), http://www.chinaembassy.org.sg/eng/whsw/t165697.htm. 
 32. Kahn, supra note 12. 
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military governor during the tenth-century Fifth Dynasty.33 Using chisels 
and crowbars, these raiders stripped ten marble sculptures from the walls. 
In their haste, the looters destroyed priceless archaeological objects and 
historical knowledge. Five years passed before any of these sculptures 
were seen in public.34 In 1999, a prominent Hong Kong auction house 
listed a single Chuzi marble relief for sale with New York auction house 
Christie’s.35 Although the piece was removed from the auction by 
American authorities and repatriated to China, this story illustrates the 
threat to Chinese cultural property. 
B. China Has Not Sufficiently Protected Its Own Cultural Property 
The CPIA’s second requirement imposes a duty on the requesting state 
to take measures consistent with the Convention36 to protect its own 
cultural heritage. Article 5 of the Convention sets forth a member nation’s 
affirmative duties in this regard. Under Article 5 a member nation is 
responsible for establishing a national agency to (a) contribute to the 
formation of draft laws and regulations designed to secure the protection 
of cultural heritage; (b) establish and maintain a registry of important 
cultural property; (c) promote the development or establishment of 
institutions designed to preserve and present cultural property (i.e., 
museums, libraries, archives, etc.); (d) organize and supervise 
archaeological excavations to ensure the protection of in situ cultural 
property; (e) establish ethical guidelines for those, such as curators, 
 
 
 33. Dutra, supra note 30, at 63. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 
289 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1972) [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention]. Fifty nations gathered 
together in Paris in the spring of 1970 to form a unified front against illicit art and antiquities theft in 
the form of an international agreement to help member nations curb the international black market in 
looted antiquities. The Convention is the most significant achievement and agreement on the subject of 
looted and illegally imported cultural property to date. The Convention obligates parties to protect all 
cultural property against theft, illegal clandestine excavation, and illegal export. Parties are encouraged 
to take definitive actions including: drafting laws and regulations; supervising archaeological sites; 
promulgating rules of ethics for dealers, curators, and collectors; and giving appropriate publicity to 
the disappearance of any items. The Convention is also significant in that it represents a marked 
departure from the trend of cultural internationalism towards cultural nationalism. It endorses export 
restrictions and nationalization of cultural objects. It also observes that one of the biggest causes of the 
“impoverishment of the cultural heritage” of source nations is the illicit trade in antiquities. This is the 
first time that the phrase “cultural heritage” is used to denote these objects. In so doing, the 
Convention implicitly recognized the importance of a culture’s antiquities to its heritage and 
community.  
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collectors, and antique dealers, who deal with cultural property; (f) take 
educational measures to engender respect for the cultural heritage of all 
states; and (g) give appropriate publicity to the disappearance of any items 
of cultural property.37 While not explicitly stated, Article 5 appears to 
impose an overall duty on nations to protect their own cultural property to 
the best of their ability. It is this overall duty that may be deemed the 
“spirit” of the Convention.38 
The language of the CPIA does not mandate that China must strictly 
adhere to every Article 5 guideline.39 As such, nothing precludes the 
President from applying a balancing approach to the question of whether 
China has taken “measures consistent with the Convention” in determining 
the availability of CPIA protection.40 However, when it is apparent that a 
member nation has not observed Article 5’s guidelines in the spirit of the 
Convention, it would seem that a balancing approach would weigh heavily 
against offering CPIA protection in the form of a bilateral agreement. 
China has passed a variety of laws surrounding cultural property, or 
relics as they are commonly called by the Chinese government.41 The 
underlying basis for China’s cultural property legislation is found in 
Article 22 of the 1982 Constitution: 
The state promotes the development of art and literature, the press, 
radio and television broadcasting, publishing and distribution 
services, libraries, museums, cultural centres and other cultural 
undertakings that serve the people and socialism, and it sponsors 
 
 
 37. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 36.  
 38. See Maria Papageorge Kouroupas, U.S. Efforts to Protect Cultural Property, Implementation 
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 28 AFRI. ARTS No. 4 (SPECIAL ISSUE), 32, 33–36 (1995). 
Kouroupas has been the Executive Director of CPAC since 1993. In this article, she mentions the 
“spirit of the Convention” two times. In referring to the CPIA, she notes that the “spirit of the 
Convention was enacted into law to promote U.S. leadership in achieving greater international 
cooperation towards preserving cultural treasures that are of importance not only to the nations whence 
they originate, but also to greater international understanding of mankind’s common heritage.” Id. at 
33. Later, she observes that “[n]umerous American museums have adopted stricter acquisitions 
policies in harmony with the spirit of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the U.S. enabling 
legislation.” Id. at 36. Kouroupas’s background and placement at the helm of the single U.S. agency 
responsible for international agreements based on the CPIA, lends much credence to her belief in the 
spirit of the Convention. 
 39. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(B) (2000) merely requires a state party take “measures consistent 
with the Convention.” 
 40. Id. Courts have previously used balancing approaches when dealing with cultural property. 
See, e.g., Oliver Metzger, Making the Doctrine of Res Extra Commercium Visible in United States 
Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 615, 634 (1996). 
 41. See infra note 45. There appears to be virtually no difference in the meaning of the two terms 
as they are applied to looted artifacts; however, “relics” also encompasses fossils and other human 
remains, whereas “artifacts” covers human creations.  
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mass cultural activities. The state protects sites of scenic and 
historical interest, valuable cultural monuments and relics and 
other significant items of China’s historical and cultural heritage.42  
In 1982, China passed the Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics 
(“1982 LPCR”).43 This law brought cultural property under state control 
by authorizing municipal, county, and provincial regulations for the 
management and protection of cultural property.44 It covered both 
unearthed and in situ artifacts and made the looting of these artifacts 
illegal.45 Artifacts unearthed by looters were considered stolen property. A 
system of grading was employed as the means for assigning the duties of 
protection.46 This system of grading is a major flaw in the legislation since 
only the highest grade of antiquities are protected by the state, leaving ill-
funded provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities to care for the 
protection of more common antiquities.47 
In 2002, China added to the 1982 LPCR by passing the Law on the 
Protection of Cultural Relics (“2002 LPCR”).48 The 2002 amendment 
legalized the purchase, by individuals, of certain cultural property, which 
 
 
 42. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [XIAN FA] art. 22 (1982) (P.R.C.) reprinted in 
THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1979–1982, 10 (Legislative Affairs Commission of 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. & the Foreign Languages Press) (1987) (emphasis added). 
 43. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics was adopted 
at the twenty-fifth meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress and 
was promulgated by Order No. 11 of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
and effective as of November 19, 1982. Reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, 1979–1982, 313 (1987) [hereinafter 1982 LPCR]. 
 44. Id. art. 3. See also Anne C. Schmidt, The Confuciusornis Sanctus: An Examination of 
Chinese Cultural Property Law and Policy in Action, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 202 (2000). 
 45. 1982 LPCR, supra note 43, art. 4. Article 4 reads “[a]ll cultural relics remaining underground 
. . . shall be owned by the state. Sites of ancient culture, ancient tombs and cave temples shall be 
owned by the state. Memorial buildings, ancient architectural structures, stone carvings, etc., 
designated for protection by the state, unless governed by other state regulations, shall be owned by 
the state. Cultural relics in the collection of state organs, armed forces, enterprises owned by the whole 
people and public institutions shall be owned by the state.” Id. 
 46. Id. art. 28 (“It shall be prohibited to take out of the country any cultural relics of significant 
historical, artistic or scientific value . . . .”). Determination of a cultural relic’s significance and value 
was up to the state, thereby creating a complicated system of value, not easily understood. 
 47. Schmidt, supra note 44, at 205. 
 48. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protection of Cultural Relics (Order of the 
President No. 76), Oct. 28, 2002; reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2002, 
167 (2003) (Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. & the 
Foreign Languages Press) (2003) [hereinafter 2002 LPCR]. In early 2002, the twenty-seventh session 
of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress (“NPC”) engaged in fierce 
debates over whether or not to legalize private transactions in cultural property. Under the 1982 LPCR, 
private transactions were illegal. The 1982 LPCR banned people and organizations, other than those 
approved by the cultural administration authority, from transacting in cultural property. 1982 LPCR, 
supra note 43, arts. 24–25. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] HISTORICAL HEIST 117 
 
 
 
 
had been illegal under the 1982 LPCR.49 Chinese officials hoped that such 
private transactions would disincentivize black market trade and help 
preserve cultural property.50 With these goals in mind, the 2002 LPCR 
legalized the transfer of non-state-owned cultural property in five 
instances: legal inheritance or gift, purchase from cultural relics shops, 
purchase from cultural relics auction enterprises, exchanges or transfers 
between individual citizens pursuant to law, and other methods authorized 
by the central government.51 In an effort to address the rising number of 
looted tombs, the 2002 LPCR banned any transfer of state-owned cultural 
relics, including any relics not yet found or documented.52  
The 1982 LPCR appears on its face to constitute a meaningful exercise 
of China’s authority and eagerness to concretely address the systematic 
destruction of her cultural heritage. However, upon a deeper investigation, 
inconsistencies and loopholes appear unaddressed. Article 50 legalized 
private collections of antiquities through lawful inheritance or acceptance 
as gifts. No provisions appear to temper the ability of an individual to 
“gift” illicit cultural property, regardless of whether or not state-owned 
cultural property is present.53 Furthermore, neither of these two methods 
necessitates much in the way of a paper trail—leaving open the danger that 
the illicit cultural property market will continue behind the veil of legally 
authorized gifts. Despite Article 50’s attempt to clarify by mandating that 
“valuable cultural relics” may not be collected, China has confused the 
issue further by injecting the concept of value into what may or may not 
be collected.  
The 2002 LPCR also appears to encourage citizen participation in the 
preservation of cultural property. However, the rewards are neither 
concrete nor certain, rendering these incentives useless.54 Article 12 of the 
legislation provides for moral encouragement or material rewards to units 
and individuals for implementing laws and regulations that protect cultural 
 
 
 49. 2002 LPCR, supra note 48, art. 50. 
 50. Chinese Lawmakers Fiercely Debated Whether the Country Should Open Its Cultural 
Property Market to Private Collectors, MUSEUM SECURITY MAILINGLIST REP. (Museum Sec. 
Network, Rotterdam, Neth.), May 8, 2002, http://www.museum-security.org/02/058.html#4. Zhou 
Keyu, Vice-Director of the NPC’s Law Committee, noted that the 2002 amendment was drafted in 
response to calls by some legislators to meet the increasing demand of private cultural relics collectors, 
who believe opening the market will help protect cultural property. Legislator Xie Youquing stated 
that the “[p]rivate transaction of cultural property will help collect those treasures that have been 
drained” and will likely help the current looting problem. Id. 
 51. 2002 LPCR, supra note 48, art. 50. 
 52. Id. art. 51. 
 53. Id. Article 51 explicitly bans the purchase or sale of state-owned cultural relics, except those 
that are specifically approved for sale or purchase by the state. 
 54. Id. art. 12. 
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relics, fighting criminal acts in the interest of protecting cultural relics, 
donating relics in one’s own collection to the state in the interest of 
protecting the relics, immediately reporting the discovery of relics, making 
important contributions to archaeology or innovations in the protection of 
cultural relics, rescuing cultural relics in danger of destruction, and making 
outstanding contributions to the protection of cultural relics.55 Although 
China may give material rewards to entice nationalistic repatriation, it is 
not legally bound to do so. Furthermore, these “incentives” will likely not 
be able to match the rewards offered by black market dealers who pay the 
equivalent of a year’s farming income for a single looted artifact.56 The 
development of a concrete, legally mandated reward structure would be a 
straightforward method to encourage the notoriously impoverished 
population that is likely to find these relics. By remaining obscure as to 
rewards, the 2002 LPCR merely gives lip service to the notion of citizen 
enforcement.  
Also, the 2002 LPCR continues the confusion beset by the 1982 LPCR 
by mandating that the central government is responsible for protecting 
only the most precious relics.57 In contrast, the new legislation leaves the 
remaining artifacts under the protection of local, county, and provincial 
governments that have been shown to have little effect in doing so.58 The 
current Chinese legal system provides local governments wide latitude in 
balancing the economic development of their region with the conservation 
of antiquities.59 Poverty, lack of educational resources, and economic 
hardship often make the decision to fund protection for what many view as 
grimy old statues and pots seem like an unwise choice.  
 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Beech, supra note 2. One of the primary difficulties in curbing looting is the fact that in a 
single night, a looter who finds a “major haul” can earn a year’s farming income upon unloading it to a 
smuggler. See also Schmidt, supra note 44, at 195. Schmidt observes that a “Chinese farmer who turns 
up the skeleton of an ancient bird can easily make twice his yearly salary if he sells it on the black 
market.” Id. 
 57. Dutra, supra note 30, at 86 (citing PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, RULES FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CULTURAL RELICS PROTECTION LAW, art. 8, Apr. 30, 1992). Michael L. 
Dutra notes that the vagueness of the language also contributes to the difficulty in ascertaining which 
government level has administrative jurisdiction over a particular cultural relic. Id. 
 58. Over 200 Cultural Relics Stolen from Official Chinese Sites in 2004, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
(Beijing), Feb. 22, 2005. In 2004 there was an 81.8% increase in cases involving stolen cultural relics 
according to a report provided by the State Administration of Cultural Heritage. Despite a 14.6% drop 
in theft from China’s protected sites (as opposed to non-protected sites), 20% of the total cases 
involved theft from government offices responsible for the care and preservation of relics, pointing to 
corruption, lack of security, or perhaps both. Id. 
 59. Id.  
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As an example of this problem, in 2001 a rumor raced through the 
desolate villages southeast of Xi’an that any artifact from the tomb of 
Empress Dou, a wealthy dowager who died in 135 B.C., would be worth a 
sizeable amount.60 Despite the common belief that Dou’s tomb had 
previously been looted, villagers blasted through the entrance with a fifty-
kilogram lump of homemade dynamite. The following morning police 
spotted five raiders and eventually captured three. Although the press 
hailed the capture of these looters as a triumph, the under-funded local 
cultural relics bureau “simply placed wooden planks across the hole, 
tossed in some dirt and walked away.”61 This neglect led to further looting, 
which resulted in a loss of at least two hundred artifacts, some valued at 
approximately eighty thousand dollars.62  
Apart from its quite limited statutory protections of cultural property, 
China has also failed in responding to Hong Kong’s booming legalized 
market in antiquities, which poses a serious threat to the protection of 
China’s cultural patrimony. American experts on the illicit cultural 
property market estimate that from 2000 to 2004 the total antiquities 
auction market in China and Hong Kong “increased approximately 700% 
for the same materials that the U.S. is being asked to restrict.”63 Thus, the 
Hong Kong market seemingly undercuts any usefulness that import 
restrictions may provide.  
Lastly, China has not followed the spirit of the Convention.64 Although 
China has often exhibited defiant behavior, one notable example is its 
apathy towards the destruction of countless antiquities during construction 
of the Three Gorges Dam. This twenty-five billion dollar public 
construction project is causing a scale of cultural property devastation that 
will dwarf the plundering of individual tomb raiders.65 China has notice of 
the destruction that this construction will cause, and yet has chosen to 
continue with the plan regardless of known consequences.66 It is estimated 
that the water diversion project will alone submerge 710 historical areas 
according to statistics from the State Administration of Cultural 
 
 
 60. Beech, supra note 2. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Pearlstein, supra note 18. 
 64. See Kouroupas, supra note 38; see also Chinese Minister Apologizes for Not Protecting 
Cultural Heritage, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Beijing), May 26, 2006. Courtyard homes as many as 
seven hundred years old will be demolished to make way for a pedestrian commercial area by the time 
Beijing hosts the Olympics in 2008. Despite citizen protests, China has decided to carry out the 
demolition. Id. 
 65. Timothy Potts, Where Quantity Yields to Quality, APOLLO MAG. LTD., Oct. 1, 2007, at 42. 
 66. See Wu Chong, Bone Collectors Race Against Time, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 12, 2006, at 13. 
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Heritage.67 Thousands of archeologically documented yet unexplored sites 
as many as four thousand years old will be destroyed by the eventual 
completion of the Three Gorges Dam.68 In at least one area, an ancient 
cemetery containing approximately 160 graves dating to 500 B.C. will be 
submerged by the Three Gorges Dam project.69 Archaeologists do not 
have time to excavate, much less gain any valuable information from a 
thorough analysis of these areas.  
Preservation work in the area soon to be submerged by the Three 
Gorges Dam project has also been slowed by a lack of funding.70 Figures 
show that more than two thousand tombs and over ten thousand artifacts 
have already been relocated, but this merely accounts for a small part of 
the artifacts in the area, according to Li Taoyuan, a senior archaeologist 
from China’s Hebei Province.71 The chief of the Danjiangkou Heritage 
Bureau claims that archaeologists are competing against grave robbers for 
artifacts and that unfortunately, due to a lack of government resources, the 
raiders are winning.72 In light of these concerns, China should have altered 
the timetable of the Three Gorges Dam construction to provide an 
adequate period for archaeological excavation. China’s full knowledge and 
complacency that its cultural property will be destroyed should be viewed 
as a direct affront to the spirit of the Convention. 
C. Import Restrictions Will Not Deter Pillage and May Very Well Increase 
It 
Under the CPIA’s third requirement, any import restrictions must be of 
substantial benefit in deterring pillage of the cultural heritage of the state 
party to the Convention, in this case China.73 The concept of deterrence 
differs from that of prevention and has a lower threshold for success.74 
 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Experts Struggle to Preserve Relics from Megaproject, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 18, 2007, at 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i) (2000).  
 74. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) defines “deterrence” as “the act or process of 
discouraging certain behavior, particularly by fear; esp., as a goal of criminal law, the prevention of 
criminal behavior by fear of punishment.” Id. at 481. “Prevention,” on the other hand, is “to hinder or 
impede.” Id. at 1226. See also WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2001). To “deter” is 
“to prevent or discourage from acting, esp. by means of doubt or fear.” Id. at 309. To “prevent,” 
conversely, is “to keep from happening.” Id. at 876. Both of these dictionaries imply that the concept 
of “deterrence” is merely to discourage, although concededly Webster’s grants that prevention is a 
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Under the CPIA, proposed restrictions must at the very least be of 
“substantial benefit in deterring” pillage.75 Even under this low standard, 
import restrictions will fail. An economic analysis explains the inherent 
weakness of cultural property import restrictions.  
Art has value. To conclude otherwise would be a gross distortion of 
reality. Cultural property is a variety of art. It reflects a people’s history, 
lifestyle, ingenuity, and hardships, thereby retaining historic and 
educational value. Cultural property has an unquestionable monetary 
value.76 Both dealers and thieves of cultural property have an intimate 
appreciation of this value.77 Indeed, they stake their livelihood on this 
truth.  
Most collectors have an appreciation of this monetary value, however 
the great collectors also have an intimate understanding of the full value, 
monetary and otherwise. For the great collectors, cultural property is an 
object of great pride, beauty, and history as well as a “good” in the market 
sense.78 Museums, institutional collectors, and private individual collectors 
regularly sell parts of their collections in an effort to generate funds for 
future acquisitions that will contribute to the overall development of their 
holdings.79 One small example is the Los Angeles County Museum of 
 
 
method of deterrence, whereas “prevention” is distinguished from “deterrence” through an implication 
of harsher physical force.  
 75. 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (a)(1)(c)(i). The CPIA was designed to be prospective. It is more an 
instrument of prevention than one designed to redress prior losses. The CPIA was implemented to 
protect cultural property that remains in situ in the country of origin—the undocumented material that, 
when stripped of its provenience, feeds a large clandestine trade that brings high yield with little risk to 
its participants. As such, CPIA protection should at the very minimum deter future pillage. Kouroupas, 
supra note 38, at 33. 
 76. On October 7, 2007, Sotheby’s Asia sold approximately $42.5 million in Chinese art. See 
James Pomfret, Sotheby’s Bullish on Global Art Market, China, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. ONLINE, 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/20071008-0242-sothebys-hongkong-.html. 
 77. See Beech, supra note 2. Hannah Beech observes that stealing national treasures through 
looting is obviously illegal, but there is little to deter smugglers. The reason is that one major haul for a 
looter can equal a year’s farming income. One looter that she interviewed put himself through medical 
school with the spoils of his treasure hunts. This particular looter noted that it is easy to tell who has 
found the best tombs by merely looking at the houses in his native village in Henan province. The 
luckiest looters will have satellites, big-screen TVs, and video game systems. This doctor’s favorite 
video game is (not surprisingly) Tomb Raider. Id. 
 78. Art collections must undergo renewal to remain current, fresh, and top of the line. For many 
museums and collectors this means selling off parts of their collections in an effort to raise money for 
future, better acquisitions. There are a few reasons for such divestiture. First, some museums harbor 
latent and persistent prejudices against certain artists and are happy to sell their pieces in order to 
acquire different works. Second, some museums house a tremendous amount of art in storehouses and 
the sale of such art is merely a way of clearing out these areas. Third, as museums and collectors 
expand their overall collection, it is wise to sell off some items in an effort to expand. See Carol Vogel, 
Museums Set to Sell Art, and Some Experts Cringe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005, at A24. 
 79. Id. Imagine a museum known for its collection of Mayan sculpture. Suppose also that at 
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Art’s recent auctioning of forty-three works at Sotheby’s in an effort to 
improve its expanding collection.80 Some critics denounce these sales as 
tantamount to museum heresy in that certain works should not be publicly 
distributed, but rather should be housed in national institutions for their 
preservation. However, the majority of museums and collectors realize the 
necessity of such sales if they are to continue to bolster their principal 
collections.81 
Museums and collectors must be attuned to the market if they are to 
improve their collections. Being attuned to the market means that the 
collector must have information on what art is soon to become available 
and its approximate value. This is necessary to ensure that collectors are 
able to purchase art that will best improve their collections, while at the 
same time paying a price that will provide the maximum acquisition 
without depleting their coffers. As such, museums and collectors are 
constantly analyzing the availability of art, market value of desirable types 
of art, and legal scenarios that may hinder or promote the sales of these 
desirables. Such buyer sophistication inevitably leads to market 
fluctuations when a deficit is perceived in the number of any given 
desirable object.  
Buyer sophistication is slightly different when contemplating 
antiquities for a few reasons. First, sophisticated buyers of cultural 
property can never be sure of the total number of a given class of 
antiquities. Since often these cultural artifacts are buried with little record 
of their existence, no one can be sure of their existence until they are 
unearthed. This leads to widespread speculation and an unpredictably 
volatile market. Second, since the transport and sale of cultural artifacts is 
a tremendous black market enterprise, any regulations or embargoes on it 
will drastically affect the market price. Perceived availability therefore 
affects market price. Perceived availability and actual availability are two 
distinct concepts and will be treated as such.82 
 
 
some point in the past it acquired many exquisite pieces of Delft pottery. This fictional museum may 
be inclined to slowly sell off its Delft collection to raise money for the purchase of exquisite Mayan 
sculptures to aid in the development of its principal collection. 
 80. Id. The auctioning is expected to return between $10.4 and $15.4 million. Among the works 
auctioned is a Modigliani portrait of the Spanish landscape painter Manuel Humbert, estimated to 
bring $4 million to $6 million. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 318–19 
(1982). Bator observes the following:  
For the foreigner interested in acquiring a certain category of antiquity, a simple logic 
operates: The harder it is to obtain objects within that category legally, the more intense the 
demand to acquire them on the black market. As the embargo becomes more and more 
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Oil is exemplary of this principle. Admittedly oil is a commodity,83 
whereas cultural property is valuable due to its inherent uniqueness. 
However, these two markets are comparable in a few respects. First, oil is 
highly desirable.84 Second, the overall amount of remaining oil in the 
world is unknown.85 Third, oil is purchased on a tremendous scale by 
extremely sophisticated buyers.86 Fourth, fluctuations in the market price 
of oil are largely the result of perceived unavailability, international 
conflict, or any other disturbance in the general chain of production and 
shipment.87 While the actual availability of oil changes on occasion, the 
price is largely controlled by perceived availability. War does not 
necessarily indicate any reduction in the amount of oil actually available, 
yet it tends to contribute to a perception that oil will be difficult to obtain; 
it therefore raises the market price. 
By most academic standards and economic indicators, the United 
States economy operates under what is known as a semi-strong market, 
which is a division of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(“ECMH”).88 Under this theory, investors are sophisticated and 
quantitatively large enough that the market price of any good should 
reflect perceived notions of availability and quality on a continuous 
basis.89 Thus, when it is proven that many sophisticated investors in a 
 
 
inclusive within a particular category, the number of purchasers willing to deal illegally and 
the amount of funds available on the illegal market also increases. The black market, in sum, 
is a product of scarcity. Buyers are willing to pay the cost of conniving in illegal export 
because there is no alternative supply, if legal export were permitted, the illegal market would 
shrink.  
Id. 
 83. Generally the term “commodity” is used to describe a mass-produced, non-specialized good 
supplied without qualitative differentiation across a given market. Other examples of commodities are 
most agricultural goods, ethanol, gold, and iron ore.  
 84. See Shock Treatment, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2007, at 92. Oil is so highly desired that the lack 
thereof has been the primary cause of two major global recessions, in 1973 and 1979. Id. 
 85. See Clifford Krauss, Tapping a Trickle in West Texas: High Prices Revive Oil Fields, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at B1. The nation’s oil fields are mostly tapped out, leading to a steady decline in 
U.S. oil production over the past six years. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES: OPEC LONG-TERM 
STRATEGY (2006), available at http://www.opec.org/library (scroll down to “OPEC LONG-TERM 
STRATEGY” and follow “read more” hyperlink). 
 87. See Vote For Me, Dimwit, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2007, at 42. Nearly all economists agree that 
fluctuations in the price of oil are due to the mechanisms of supply and demand, not due to greed on 
the part of large oil companies. Id. 
 88. Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 554–55 (1983).  
 89. Id. Market efficiency is maximized when prices fully reflect all available information. A 
semi-strong market is one in which investors are of such sophistication that information is subsumed 
into the marketplace instantly. This synergy of all available information including perceptions of 
availability leads to the constant fluctuation of a good’s true value in the marketplace. Id. 
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given good exist and are attuned to a complex information network 
providing accurate data on that good, it may also be assumed that any 
perceived decline in that good’s availability will cause the market price of 
that good to rise almost instantaneously. Following this logic, if it were 
proven that (1) an intricate network of highly sophisticated investors 
existed for Chinese cultural property, and that these investors are attuned 
to an available information network, it may be deduced that any perceived 
decline in the availability of these goods will cause the market price of 
Chinese cultural property to skyrocket.  
Taking that logic a step further, if it were then proven that (2) 
perceived availability did not accurately reflect actual availability, (3) 
demand for the good will not subside, and (4) suppliers generally 
incorporate the concept of risk into the price of any good, it follows that 
the market price of that good will remain high regardless of any decline in 
actual availability. Rephrased, if an embargo on Chinese cultural property 
frightens investors, the market price of this cultural property will increase 
despite the fact that there is no actual decline in the number of looted 
cultural objects being shipped into the United States. To complicate 
matters, the price of the cultural property will remain high because 
producers (i.e., looters and middlemen) must incorporate into their price 
structure the risk that they undertake in shipping the illicit antiquities. 
Since looters generally raid tombs for profit, an increase in the price paid 
for such goods will likely draw greater numbers of people into the 
“profession.” Thus, if the United States imposes import restrictions on 
nearly all Chinese cultural property, there is a high probability of further 
escalating the problem of looting. 
1. An Intricate Network of Sophisticated Investors Exists 
It is commonly accepted that eighty to ninety percent of cultural 
property on the market is illicit.90 The tremendous demand for Chinese 
cultural property is fueled by wealthy Western and Eastern collectors 
looking to decorate their living quarters with the treasures of the past.91 
These collectors are investors in cultural property, eager to purchase 
artifacts many experts, and looters, would not have imagined anyone 
would actually collect. The appetite for Chinese cultural property is so 
voracious these days that investors are collecting chipped and dirty clay 
 
 
 90. Beech, supra note 2. This statistic came from Kathryn Tubb, Conservator of the Institute of 
Archaeology at the University College of London. 
 91. Id. 
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pots, gnarled ceramic statuettes, and other detritus of burial rites.92 
Museums are also investors, as discussed earlier.93 Often museum curators 
make the decision to invest in certain artifacts with the full knowledge that 
these artifacts will be used as pawns down the road to purchase an even 
grander, more desirable object.94 
The network by which these artifacts travel is generally poorly 
documented and notoriously difficult to stop. Farmers, peasants, and 
villagers get word that Westerners are very interested in purchasing old 
Chinese artifacts from ancient burial sites near their village. This message 
is spread by a middleman with connections to wealthy Western and 
Eastern antiquities dealers. The villagers hunt at night for artifacts, 
knowing full well where they are likely to be found from either stories of 
burial sites, passed down for generations, or sophisticated land survey 
techniques.95 By the morning, when there is evidence of looting, the goods 
found have been safely stored away.96 Any goods are sold to a middleman 
who informs his Western and Eastern dealers of the find and makes the 
sale. 
At the beginning of 2002, an interesting case in New York caught the 
attention of antiquities dealers worldwide. Although having little to do 
with Chinese cultural property, the case provides a rare glimpse into the 
illicit looting of antiquities and the complicated path they take on their 
journey through the black market.97 In 1994, laborers excavating a 
building site in Akhmim in Upper Egypt discovered a four foot high 
hieroglyphic-incised slab of limestone.98 A few months later a man named 
Ali Farag was blindfolded and driven to the spot where the stele had been 
discovered. Rather than turn over the artifact to the government, the 
 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 94. Vogel, supra note 78. 
 95. Paul Watson, Archaeologist Views Past As Lesson for New China, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 17, 
1997, at A1. Baoping Wang, a twenty-one-year veteran of Chinese archaeology who began his career 
as an eighteen-year-old, uses techniques similar to those used by looters. Using a luoyang spade, a tool 
named after the place where tomb robbers invented it eight hundred years ago, he can detect 
underground vaults built more than two thousand years ago. Wang detects these vaults by analyzing 
subtle changes in the soil color of a core sample, produced by the luoyang spade. He claims that it 
takes merely five minutes to produce the information. Id. 
 96. Bator, supra note 82, at 311. Often in remote areas, evidence of looting is unknown for years. 
Until such a discovery, there is no one to complain. Even if there is a complaint, often the harm is not 
widely appreciated and the perpetrator goes unpunished. Id. 
 97. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 98. Barry Meier & Martin Gottlieb, LOOT: Along the Antiquities Trail; An Illicit Journey out of 
Egypt, Only a Few Questions Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at A1 (providing a much more 
detailed account of this fascinating journey). 
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builders decided to sell it on the black market. After showing Farag the 
artifact along with blueprints of the project, Farag departed the site, 
presumably having purchased the stele and a few other artifacts for 
approximately seventy thousand dollars.99  
Farag later contacted a Cambridge-educated Englishman named 
Jonathan Tokeley-Parry, a talented antiquities restorer who was adept at 
smuggling. Tokeley-Parry agreed to help Farag. He first established the 
stele’s authenticity through manipulating Dr. Jaromir Malek, director of 
the world’s foremost archive of Egyptology.100 After establishing its 
authenticity, Tokeley-Parry faxed the galleries of Frederick Schultz in 
Manhattan, which agreed to purchase the object. Schultz wired fifty-two 
thousand dollars as a down payment for the stele and awaited its arrival—
but it never appeared. Tokeley-Parry had created a false company called 
H.H. Antiques. The stele was supposed to have arrived in Zurich under 
that name before being shipped to Schultz, but it never arrived. Shipping 
manifests, later discovered, suggest that it had arrived in Zurich, but was 
then placed on a truck to Geneva.101 
Once in Geneva, the stele resurfaced in 1997 at the Phoenix Ancient 
Art Gallery. The owners, two brothers, claim that their father had 
purchased the stele from H.H. Antiques many years back, however no 
records substantiate this claim. In 1998, Bernard Blondeel, a Parisian 
gallery owner of Belgian heritage, walked into the Geneva gallery and 
purchased the stele. Blondeel toured the object through Europe and 
purchased a full-page advertisement in the Revue du Louvre, a Paris 
gallery guide, to tempt a buyer.102 His efforts paid off when in May of 
1999 a New York developer named H. Henry Elghanayan agreed to 
purchase the stele for $210,000. Authorities finally recovered the stele in 
Elghanayan’s grand foyer, across the street from the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art.103 This circuitous journey illustrates both the difficulties 
 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. The Griffith Institute of the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford University boasts this honor. 
Tokeley-Parry posed as a lawyer who was researching the piece. He was attempting to determine 
whether the stele had been stolen from a known archaeological site or storeroom. Knowing this 
information would allow him to smuggle the artifact much more smoothly. And if the artifact were 
found to have been stolen from a known site, the value would likely be depreciated because it could 
not be sold on the open market. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. Ironically, during an annual antiques show at the Seventh Regiment Armory in 
Manhattan, where Blondeel was attempting to sell the stele, he had a booth only feet from one owned 
by Frederick Schultz. Id. 
 103. Id. Apparently authorities began investigating the stele when Tokeley-Parry was arrested and 
convicted in a British smuggling case and began asking questions about Schultz. Id. 
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of preventing smuggling and the sophistication of the art investors 
involved.  
A similar path awaits most illicit Chinese antiquities. This type of black 
market is difficult to initially prevent because the tombs yielding 
profitable artifacts are not marked, leading to confusion on the part of 
guards, police, and the Chinese government as to where to position 
themselves.104 Middlemen are largely responsible for the connectivity of 
the network. They are paid handsomely for finding villagers to complete 
the looting and a network of smugglers to do the rest.105 Oftentimes these 
smuggling rings are based out of legitimate antique shops in major cities, 
where police are overworked and underpaid.106 This complicated system is 
highly attuned to the market and will respond quickly to a perceived threat 
of embargo. 
2. Perceived Availability Does Not Equal Actual Availability in This 
Black Market 
Despite persistent threats of death, the Chinese villagers responsible for 
devastating the tombs of their ancestors continue digging.107 The black 
market system that exists at present shows no signs of slowing. In this 
context, any embargo imposed in a vacuum is bound to fail. First, the 
broader and more inclusive the embargo, the more difficult it becomes 
physically, economically, and politically to enforce effectively.108 
Furthermore, a comprehensive embargo is extremely expensive, 
cumbersome, and inefficient. The cost of the United States implementing 
an embargo on nearly every Chinese archaeological artifact would be 
 
 
 104. Lisa Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 377, 393 (1995). 
 105. Some of these networks are extremely sophisticated. In India, police arrested a fifty-five-
year-old, graying, unassuming handicrafts trader named Vaman Narayan Ghia as the leader one of the 
largest antiquities-smuggling rings of all time. Inside Ghia’s home, police found hundreds of photos of 
looted ninth- to eleventh-century statues, a long list of private collectors’ phone numbers and sixty-
eight auction-house catalogs that featured some of the same artifacts. According to his confession, 
Ghia spent thirty years smuggling an estimated fifty thousand idols, paintings, and statues from 
protected monuments in India. Charges were filed against Ghia and twenty-one other looters alleged to 
be in his smuggling ring. Beech, supra note 2. 
 106. Id. Hong Kong’s Hollywood Road is a transit point for many looted Chinese artifacts. Beech 
notes that one Hollywood Road dealer (who declined to be named) said that if someone walked in off 
the streets and wanted to see some “real” antiques, he would show them fakes, but if someone walked 
in and inquired about a very specific item and also knew what the market rate was for that item, he 
would bring out looted goods. Id. 
 107. Id. In 2002 Chinese authorities sentenced at least four looters to death. Id.  
 108. Bator, supra note 82, at 329. 
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outlandish.109 Currently the United States has 361 commercial ports that 
receive 95% of U.S. imports by weight and 75% by value, with 
approximately nine million shipping containers arriving annually.110 
Chinese fleets of shipping vessels are growing rapidly.111 The port of Los 
Angeles, the largest container port in the world and the likely destination 
of containers from China, moves 7.3 million containers annually.112 
Interestingly, 80% of port operations at the port of Los Angeles are 
controlled by foreign firms, which may undermine any U.S. initiative 
barring Chinese antiquity imports.113 Inspection costs would fall either to 
China or the United States, inevitably deterring trade, which neither nation 
wants. Thus, inspection and, consequently, an embargo is at most an 
empty promise. 
Widespread corruption also undermines any intended embargo.114 In 
2004, Li Haitao, former head of the Cultural Relics Protection Department 
for a historically important Chinese imperial villa, was found guilty of 
stealing 259 cultural objects from the site and selling 152 of these pieces 
abroad.115 Structurally, an embargo “creates an irresistible pressure against 
 
 
 109. Id. Paul M. Bator observes:  
It is easy to say that illegally exported art may not be imported. But effectuating such a 
policy, in a society in which millions of people cross the borders every year, and into which 
art objects numbering hundreds of thousands are brought, would be a nightmare. The problem 
is not only the physical discovery of every item crossing the border; a further process to 
determine whether each such item was legally exported must be created. . . . A brisk trade in 
forged export certificates would . . . arise . . . so that the authenticity as well as the existence 
of each documentation would have to be verified.  
Id. 
 110. Randall Beisecker, Monterey Inst. of Int’l Studies, Issue Brief: DP World and U.S. Port 
Security (2006), available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_75.html. 
 111. Bei Hu and Irene Shen, CSCL Wins $1.9 Billion Shanghai Share Sale Approval, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, Nov. 23, 2007. Chinese exports rose 26.5% in the first ten months of 2007 and imports rose 
19.8%. As a result of this growth, China Shipping Container Lines Co., Asia’s second largest cargo 
box carrier, announced a $1.36 billion order to purchase eight ships from Samsung Heavy Industries 
Co. The company is seeking to grow its shipping fleet to 162 ships by 2009. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Warring, supra note 36, at 237. “Karim Abu Shanab, right-hand man to Zawi Hawass, 
the current Secretary General of Egypt’s Supreme Council for Antiquities (‘SCA’) was arrested for 
accepting a bribe to help smuggle artifacts out of [Egypt].” Id. Constantine Mitsotakis, former Prime 
Minister of Greece, and his deputy police chief were implicated in a scheme to cooperate with an 
international syndicate of antiquities smugglers. Id. at 237–38 (quoting Lisa J. Barodkin, Note, The 
Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 393, 
(1995)). 
 115. Chinese Official Sentenced to Death for Stealing Cultural Relics, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
(Beijing), Aug. 17, 2004. Haitao was sentenced to death for these crimes. However, his four 
accomplices were given jail terms that did not exceed seven years and fines that did not exceed 
thirteen thousand dollars. These are relatively light sentences and fines considering Haitao pocketed 
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itself.”116 “Most current export control systems are self-destructive. The 
international black market thrives because no alternative is allowed to 
exist for either buyers or sellers, so that all economic incentives are pushed 
in favor of the illegal trade.”117 This lack of alternatives is directly 
responsible for the widespread corruption evident in international 
antiquities smuggling.118 Since it remains impossible to stop either the 
import or export of cultural property, the perceived availability of cultural 
property will never equal its actual availability. Perception will only serve 
to inflate the current pricing structure. 
3. The Demand for Chinese Cultural Property Shows No Signs of 
Slowing 
On October 7, 2007, Sotheby’s recorded its best ever sale of Chinese 
art in Asia, selling over $42.5 million worth of art in a Hong Kong 
auction.119 Overall, the Chinese market for art in October 2007 was 
stunning.120 Merely nine sales by Sotheby’s accrued over $200 million.121 
Chinese works were in extremely high demand, accounting for over $83 
million.122 An imperially inscribed “Tai Shang Huang Di” white jade seal 
sold for $5.9 million, a record for white jade at auction.123 The U.S. and 
Western European appetite for Asian cultural property is not the sole cause 
of this epidemic.124 Admittedly, Western dealers have grown increasingly 
 
 
nearly half a million dollars from the illegal actions. Parts of the area that Haitao managed had been 
placed on the World Heritage List in 1994. Id. 
 116. Bator, supra note 82, at 318. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: 
Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13446, 2007). Researchers have found 
strong and robust evidence that the percentage under-recording of exports of cultural objects 
is highly correlated [to] the exporting country’s level of corruption as measured by a 
commonly used subjective index. Furthermore, the association between the two is stronger 
for countries that are particularly well-endowed in export restricted objects that are 
considered to be desirable in major markets.  
Id. at 12–13. This study indicates that source nations are underreporting their exports of illegal cultural 
property. Such underreporting is a direct result of corruption on many fronts. 
 119. Pomfret, supra note 76. The author notes that this sale was “fuelled by broadbased buying 
from Asian, Chinese and Western buyers.” Id. 
 120. Sotheby’s Announces 2007 Third Quarter and First Nine Months Results, PR NEWSWIRE, 
Nov. 9, 2007.  
 121. Id. This is forty-six percent higher than Sotheby’s 2006 sales, which totaled $137.2 million. 
Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. It is commonly accepted that there is a growing indulgence in Asian cultural property. 
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interested in Chinese cultural property, in part due to the ease with which 
Chinese artifacts can be acquired.125 Yet, one of the greatest contributions 
to the growing market for Chinese cultural property is the Chinese 
economic boom.126  
Recent international economic prosperity has led to the emergence of 
new collectors in Russia, India, and China.127 For most of its modern 
history, China easily qualified as a source nation due to its relatively poor 
population living among hills filled with artistic treasures.128 However, in 
recent years, the Chinese economic explosion has generated a great deal of 
wealth and, consequently, a large population that can afford the luxury of 
collecting antiquities.129 In the past two decades alone, China has observed 
sustained annual economic growth of 9.5%.130 Incomes in China have 
skyrocketed.131 Since 1990, Chinese exports have grown 1200%.132 There 
 
 
International auction houses have reported record sales for Chinese cultural property. Recently, a New 
York auction by Christie’s attracted huge amounts for Chinese items ranging from jades to ceramics. 
A collection of eighteenth-century Chinese snuff bottles fetched nearly four million dollars. China's 
Art Boom Fueled by Asian Money, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 16, 2007, available at 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jQkodU7aNG3sY-pDSLztg-PhGHQw. 
 125. The ease with which looted Chinese antiquities can be moved from underground to the 
showcase is a major contributor to the booming market. An interview with a Hong Kong dealer 
revealed the following:  
Dealers . . . adore the recently created fifteen-hour nonstop flight[] from Hong Kong to New 
York. It allows them to bring looted Chinese antiquities to the best American galleries 
quickly and easily without the two-day ordeal of stopovers and connections they used to 
endure, with all the risk of seizure, delay, or breakage that entailed. Artifacts can go from 
tomb to dealer to plane in a matter of hours.  
ROGER ATWOOD, STEALING HISTORY 31 (2004). 
 126. Baum, supra note 13, at 938–39. The accessibility of the art trade in China is clearer than 
ever. Both Christie’s and Sotheby’s are now conducting business in mainland China and Christie’s 
“has signed an agreement to conduct business in Beijing.” Id. at 939. 
 127. Pomfret, supra note 76. 
 128. Beech, supra note 2. In the desolate villages of Xi’an, villagers are “dirt poor.” However, 
some of the most valuable antiquities in the nation have been found in that dirt, including China’s 
famed terra-cotta warriors. Id. 
 129. See Tutto in Famiglia—Italian Luxury Goods, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2007, at 83. In 2006 the 
luxury goods industry grew ten to twenty percent internationally, however in China the industry grew 
by fifty percent. Historically, the luxury goods industry gains foothold when a nation’s per capita GDP 
reaches approximately seven thousand dollars. An example of this trend is the Japanese investment in 
luxury items at the end of the 1970s, when Louis Vuitton sales increased dramatically. In 2006, 
China’s wealthiest cities noted an average per capita GDP at seven thousand dollars. According to 
Giancarlo Di Risio, head of Versace, China is currently the most interesting market because it has 
some 120 million consumers who can afford his "super-luxury" wares. Id. 
 130. David Lague, Private Firms Drive China’s Growth, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 17, 2005, at 
21.  
 131. Id. A study by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”) surveyed 250,000 Chinese companies. The OECD concluded that China has sustained one 
of the world’s fastest economic developments in the past fifty years. Furthermore, the group concluded 
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is little doubt that China has indeed become a country with a sizable 
population of wealthy individuals.133 Sustained economic growth has led 
to China’s new position as a hybrid source-market nation.134 Wealthy 
Chinese individuals and corporations are avid collectors of Chinese 
antiquities.135 In the late 1990s antique markets began appearing 
throughout China, especially in the more prosperous cities such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou.136 The combination of a red-hot Chinese 
market for Chinese cultural property, the growing ease with which 
antiquities can be obtained, and plenty of cash flow has resulted in a 
booming market for illicit Chinese cultural property. 
Perhaps part of the reason for such intensity in the Chinese cultural 
property market stems from a “rekindled interest in antiquarianism and 
collecting relics” that emerged alongside the economic liberalization of the 
last decade.137 This rekindled interest may be a response to the Confucian 
veneration and respect for history.138 It may also be a product of Chinese 
socialist thought. Socialism refers to a socio-economic system in which 
property and the distribution of wealth are subject to control by the 
community.139 Socialism advocates community growth and by so doing 
 
 
that Chinese businesses have all but completely integrated themselves into the world market and may 
become the world’s largest exporter in the very near future. Id. 
 132. Conn Hallinan, China: A Troubled Dragon, FOREIGN POL. IN FOCUS, May 11, 2006, 
available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3264. 
 133. The relatively recent Chinese interest in collecting Chinese antiquities may stem from a 
revitalization of an ancient tradition of antiquarianism, which dates back hundreds of years in China. 
This Confucian respect for the past led Chinese collectors to pursue an astonishing array of antiques 
for hundreds of years, ending with the Mao Zedong Revolution. Modern Chinese economic growth has 
produced a resurgence in antiquities collecting, and with a population of over 1.3 billion, antiquities 
collecting has led to ever-increased looting of Chinese archaeological sites. See Dutra, supra note 30. 
Indeed, by the late sixteenth century, increased prosperity led to the widespread collection of antiques 
and works of art. Collecting these goods was said to be one of the “indispensable pastimes of a 
gentleman.” Id. at 69 (quoting ROSE KERR, CHINESE ART AND DESIGN: ART OBJECTS IN RITUAL AND 
DAILY LIFE 222 (1991)). 
 134. The term “hybrid source-market nation” is not a generally known term, however the concept 
is not unique. The United States is sometimes considered both a source and market nation due to the 
international appetite for Native American antiquities and the American appetite for Greek, Asian, and 
South American antiquities. See, e.g., Warring, supra note 36, at 233 n.32 (citing John Henry 
Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, in THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN 
MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW, 176, 209–11 (2000)). 
 135. Pomfret, supra note 76. Sotheby’s International Chief Executive, Robin Woodhead, noted 
that the Chinese interest in that culture’s own artwork is a result of the growing participation of China 
in the global world and its growing prosperity. Id. 
 136. J. DAVID MURPHY, PLUNDER AND PRESERVATION: CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND 
PRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 51 (1995). 
 137. Dutra, supra note 30, at 72. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Terence Ball & Richard Dagger, Socialism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2006), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/551569/socialism. 
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espouses the necessity of a connection to one’s community. The collection 
of antiquities was historically a significant method by which the Chinese 
sought this connection.140 Regardless of the ultimate reason for such a 
booming Chinese cultural property market, it seems clear that the 
international desire for these objects shows no signs of slowing. 
4. Risk Calculation in Market Value 
Under the ECMH, prices should at any time fully reflect all available 
information.141 Information in this context is data that has the capacity to 
alter one’s beliefs about the world or, in a more limited context, one’s 
beliefs about the appropriate price of an asset.142 Legal changes and 
bilateral embargoes qualify as examples of such information. Any 
perceived fluctuation in asset availability has the capacity to raise asset 
price. The risk of being imprisoned for smuggling looted artifacts most 
certainly is calculated into the cost of an asset.143 Thus, asset price should 
increase as risk increases. The illicit trade in alcohol during Prohibition 
exemplifies this principle. During Prohibition, when production and 
consumption of alcohol were made illegal,144 prices of whiskey in Iowa 
rose to between $16 and $25 per gallon.145 Adjusting for inflation, this is 
the equivalent of paying between $180 and $280 for a single gallon of 
whiskey!146 The risk of producing and smuggling whiskey was responsible 
for such astronomical prices.147 Despite this risk, there was virtually no 
decrease in actual production.148 As bootlegging grew more commonplace, 
 
 
 140. Dutra, supra note 30, at 69. 
 141. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 88.  
 142. Id.  
 143. This is not to propose that impoverished peasants complete complex risk calculations prior to 
looting. Rather, whenever an individual is posed with two options, one of which is decidedly riskier, 
that individual will inevitably choose the less risky of the two options, unless the material rewards for 
the riskier option are sufficiently large to outweigh the detrimental effects of the risk. The 
determination of what is sufficient to induce risky behavior is an individual decision, and may be 
based primarily on what is stood to be lost, rather than gained. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  
 144. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.  
 145. Lisa Ossian, Iowa Pub. Television Online, Iowa’s Prohibition Years, 1920–1933, 
http://www.iptv.org/iowapathways/mypath.cfm?ounid=ob_000162. 
 146. Inflation was calculated using The Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/. 
 147. Mark Thornton & Chetley Weise, The Success of the Great Depression Tax Revolts 23 
(Ludwig von Mises Inst., Working Paper, 1999), available at http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/ 
Thornton1.pdf. Thornton notes that the price of alcohol was higher primarily due to the risky nature of 
the business during that time. Black markets typically are associated with higher transaction costs and 
reduced information. It is also noted that alcohol prices jumped five hundred percent during 
prohibition. Id. 
 148. See Nat’l Comm’n on Marihuana & Drug Abuse, History of Alcohol Prohibition, 
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the risk of punishment was distributed over a greater number of 
individuals. This caused prices to fall to $5 per gallon of whiskey by the 
end of Prohibition.149 
The persistent dream of riches drew many Iowa farmers to begin 
producing whiskey during Prohibition.150 It is this same dream of riches 
that draws many farmers and villagers in China to loot ancient tombs. If a 
bilateral agreement banning all cultural artifacts is instituted, there is little 
doubt that the increased risk will be incorporated into the price of Chinese 
artifacts. Unfortunately, this result will likely draw more looters into the 
illicit network. 
5. Increased Looting Following Previous Import Restrictions on 
Cultural Property 
Previous cultural property import restrictions have proven themselves 
an inferior method of resolving this dilemma. On May 7, 1990, the United 
States imposed weighty restrictions on Peruvian cultural property.151 
Under Article 9 of the CPIA,152 the United States sought to bar the 
importation of certain materials flowing from the Sipán archaeological 
region in northern Peru, due to excessive and systematic looting as a result 
of international and U.S. demand for those goods.153 Then, in 1997, the 
United States renewed these restrictions with a Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MoU”), but extended the coverage to pre-colonial and 
 
 
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/LIBRARY/studies/nc/nc2a.htm. In 1921, two years after 
Prohibition had begun, 95,933 illicit distilleries were seized by the government. By 1925, that number 
was up to 172,537, and shortly thereafter in 1930, the number sat at 282,122. In connection with these 
seizures, 34,175 persons were arrested in 1921; by 1925, the number had risen to 62,747, and to a high 
in 1928 of 75,307, according to the Internal Revenue Service. Id. Speakeasies sprung up around the 
nation. Estimates of the number of speakeasies during Prohibition have been set at between 200,000 
and 500,000. Id. Interestingly, figures published by the Department of Commerce in the Statistical 
Abstract of the United States support a theory of increased alcohol consumption during Prohibition. 
The Department of Commerce lists the annual per capita consumption of hard liquor from 1910 to 
1914 at 1.46 proof gallons, whereas the same consumption during Prohibition was computed to be 
1.63 proof gallons. Note that there is dissention as to the implications of these statistics. Id. 
 149. Ossian, supra note 145. Nevertheless, five dollars in 1930 is still the equivalent of paying 
more than seventy dollars by today’s standards, a hefty price for a gallon of whiskey.  
 150. Id. 
 151. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Educ. & Cultural Affairs, Peru: U.S. Protection of 
Archaeological and Ethnological Material, http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/pefact.html. 
 152. This is the same article of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on which China has based its 
recent request. 
 153. Id. See also Carol Strickland, A Writer Tracks down Rich Pre-Incan Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 1992, at LI12. In the late 1980s Sipán artifacts were so valuable that a single gold item sold 
for $750,000 on the black market. Id. 
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colonial artifacts from all areas of Peru.154 The MoU was extended again 
in 2002 for five years, and then in 2007 it was once again extended for 
five years.155 
Despite these restrictions, the trade in Peruvian antiquities has hardly 
abated. Following the initial approval of these import restrictions, the 
goods began flowing heavily towards Japan, Germany, and Switzerland.156 
André Emmerich, a famed modern art dealer who handled archaeological 
materials from Central and South America during the 1970s and 1980s, 
stated, “[b]y the 1990s, the trade in major [Peruvian] objects had largely 
shifted to Europe, where they don’t have these regulations—leading us to 
wonder what exactly the State Department had accomplished.”157 In 1999, 
CNN reported an increase in looted cultural property flowing out of 
Peru.158 In 2005, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
recovered and seized 322 pre-Columbian artifacts that were looted in 
Peru.159 In August 2006, British authorities arrested a millionaire 
sportsman, well known in the art world, for illegal trafficking in looted 
Peruvian antiquities.160 In the first seven months of 2007, the Peruvian 
National Institute of Culture (“INC”) seized more than three thousand 
looted artifacts.161 According to one estimate by the Peruvian government, 
as much as eighteen million dollars’ worth of Peruvian artifacts is stolen 
and smuggled abroad yearly.162 A former Peruvian art smuggler, 
 
 
 154. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Educ. & Cultural Affairs, supra note 151. 
 155. Id. 
 156. ATWOOD, supra note 125.  
 157. Vincent, supra note 10, at 64. 
 158. Peru Moves Against Stolen Artifact Smugglers, CNN.COM, Sept. 11, 1999, http://www.cnn. 
com/WORLD/americas/9909/11/peru.inca.robbers/index.html. According to CNN, a main cause of the 
increase in looting was the growing disparity between rich and poor. Id. A similar trend is being felt 
currently in China. 
 159. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Agents Recover More Than 
300 Stolen Peruvian Antiquities (Sept. 23, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Sep/26-
972780.html. The items recovered were ancient pottery, burial shrouds, and gold jewelry. According 
to an art historian at Florida International University, the seizure was one of the largest in history. The 
total number of items eventually returned to Peru was 412. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, ICE Returns More Than 400 Pre-Columbian Artifacts to Peruvian Government 
(June 13, 2007), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070613miami.htm. An Italian 
national pled guilty to the trafficking charges and spent seventeen months in a federal prison. Id. 
 160. Adam Fresco, An Artful Dodge Recovers Peru's Stolen 'Mona Lisa,' THE TIMES (London), 
Aug. 18, 2006, at 5. 
 161. Taking on the Tomb Robbers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2007, at 42. The INC is working to 
repatriate trafficked artifacts from abroad. Recently, the group has joined forces with auction houses, 
customs officers, art dealers, and collectors to identify items that might have been stolen. A “red list” 
of sensitive artifacts is currently being developed by the International Council of Museums, a body 
linked to UNESCO. Peru is only the third country, after Iraq and Afghanistan, to have such a list. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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responsible for the British capture, noted that “the international trade in 
looted Peruvian artifacts is worth hundreds of millions of pounds a 
year.”163 
The growing illegal trade has not slowed as a result of U.S.-Peruvian 
cultural property import restrictions. Much to the contrary, the demand for 
looted Peruvian artifacts has grown in recent years, and along with the 
demand has grown the supply. Millions of dollars are spent on these goods 
yearly, and the methods by which looted art is smuggled out of Peru have 
grown increasingly sophisticated.164 This should come as no surprise, 
however. A legal system that merely diverts the smuggling regime 
elsewhere, provides virtually no disincentives, and encourages black 
market sophistication is bound to fail.165 
6. Bringing It All Together 
Superficially, import restrictions appear beneficial, however, it is 
apparent that at times other forces (in this case market forces) undermine 
the intended good. In the case of Chinese cultural property, it has been 
well established that a sophisticated network of investors exists and that 
network is highly attuned to the market for these goods. If this network 
perceives a decline in availability, despite the irrationality of that 
perception, we will see a distinct increase in the prices of Chinese cultural 
property due to added risk burdens. Since generally, in this fluid system, 
perceived availability does not equal actual availability, these goods will 
continue to flow out of China, unabated by the legislation. Thus, the 
United States should withhold imposing import restrictions due to the 
likely risk of further escalating import restrictions, and thereby 
undermining the intended effect of such legislation. 
 
 
 163. Fresco, supra note 160. 
 164. Id. A recently captured major smuggler was a leading figure in the art world and a well 
known millionaire sportsman. This smuggler was only captured after being conned into traveling to 
London, where he was arrested while trying to sell what is known as the “Mona Lisa of Peru’s 
heritage.” Id. 
 165. Will Grant, US Hands Back Artefacts to Peru, BBCNEWS.COM, June 14, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Americas/6751167.stm. The Italian national responsible for one of the 
largest smuggling operations of Peruvian artifacts in U.S. history spent seventeen months in federal 
prison. Id. Contrast this with the mandatory five- to twenty-year sentence for simple possession of 
cocaine base (crack cocaine) under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000). For a first 
time offender, the amount need only be five grams. 
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D. Import Restrictions Are Not Consistent with the General Interest of the 
International Community in the Interchange of Cultural Property 
Among Nations for Scientific, Cultural, and Educational Purposes 
China’s request is overbroad. The request seeks an embargo on 
virtually all archaeological material from the Paleolithic period to the Qing 
Dynasty.166 The CPIA limits restricted archaeological materials to those 
with cultural significance that are more than 250 years old and normally 
discovered as a result of excavation, clandestine digging, or exploration on 
land or under water.167 The Qing dynasty ended in 1912, and thus only half 
of that dynasty’s cultural property would retain protection. Furthermore, it 
is unclear whether the archeological materials listed in China’s request 
would fall under the CPIA’s definition of “archaeological interest.”168 Any 
state seeking protection of its antiquities under the CPIA must meet these 
criteria. Experts believe that certain categories subject to China’s request 
are not generally found in the ground and are not normally discovered 
through methods mandated by the CPIA.169 As such, China’s request 
appears overbroad and unclear.  
A brief comparison of past recipients of CPIA protection provides 
further support for this argument. El Salvador’s first request noted the 
necessity of protecting a well-defined archaeological zone where an 
estimated five thousand looter pits had already been dug.170 Peru’s initial 
request sought protection of Moche material that had recently been 
discovered on its northern coast at Sipán.171 Likewise, Guatemala’s first 
petition for an emergency import ban sought to restrict only Mayan 
artifacts originating in the Peten region.172 
 
 
 166. Public Summary, supra note 6. 
 167. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1) (2000). 
 168. 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(A). According to the CPIA, “archaeological material of the State Party” 
means “any object of archaeological interest,” leaving the definition of “interest” to the U.S. 
government. 
 169. Pearlstein, supra note 18. According to William G. Pearlstein’s research, experts believe that 
certain objects of the Ming, Qing, and certain other dynasties are entirely non-archaeological. These 
experts believe that only certain categories of the Three Kingdoms, Western and Eastern Jin, and 
Southern and Northern Dynasties and the earlier periods are “normally discovered” as a result of 
excavation, digging or exploration. Id. 
 170. Kouroupas, supra note 38, at 34. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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Recent import restrictions have concededly been broader.173 However, 
this was not the purpose of the CPIA.174 The proposed import restrictions 
will frustrate the CPIA’s purpose of maintaining consistency with a 
general international interest in promoting interchange of cultural property 
for scientific, cultural, and educational purposes. Overbroad restrictions 
unduly hinder such educational interchange by denying cultural 
institutions the materials necessary to promote such learning.175  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Antiquities are collected by an infinitesimally small percentage of the 
overall human population. Few bathe in the limelight of these artifacts. As 
a result, the shadows of poverty, famine, disease, war, and tyranny seem to 
extinguish their importance in the minds of most. So the question is posed: 
why concern ourselves with dusty pots, chipped statuaries, and the detritus 
of forgotten civilizations? Who benefits from these efforts?  
China has not met the requirements mandated by the CPIA. However, 
its cultural property nevertheless deserves protection. This protection 
should come by way of greater Chinese legal and educational reforms in 
the area of cultural property. As its economy grows, and looting increases, 
China will need to examine the value that it places on its ancient history. 
Yet, Chinese history is the history of mankind. China is home to the oldest 
 
 
 173. Vincent, supra note 10, at 66. Canada is one example. Eugene Thaw, an old masters dealer 
who was a member of the CPAC from 1995 to 1998, observed that the Committee “never saw any 
compelling evidence that Canada had a looting problem.” Id. This largely seems to be the influence of 
Maria Kouroupas’s leadership in the CPAC. Many former Committee members have noted her 
position that the antiquities trade is a dirty thing and should be eliminated. As a result the CPAC has 
been more apt to enter into import restrictions despite an adequate showing of a problem. 
 174. Id. at 63. When it was made clear that under Ms. Kouroupas, import restrictions had grown 
broader, New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan sponsored a proposal to reform the CPAC. One 
of his aides acknowledged that under her leadership, the CPAC has become dominated by 
archaeologists who seek to destroy the trade in antiquities and have no tolerance for alternative views. 
Interestingly enough, despite her hatred for the antiquities trade, her leadership has not led to sweeping 
Chinese cultural property import restrictions. See also Jeremy Kahn, Is the U.S. Protecting Foreign 
Artifacts? Don’t Ask, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at 26. Meredith Palmer, who helped establish the 
CPAC, argues that “Congress intended the committee to protect only the most significant artifacts 
from pillage, not grant broad restrictions on the import of entire categories of objects.” Id. 
 175. See Laura B. Whitman, China’s Request: Is the US Government on the Verge of Shutting 
Down the Market in Chinese Antiquities?, ORIENTATIONS ASIAN ART MAG., Apr. 2005, at 89. Marc 
Wilson, Director of the Nelson-Atkins Museum in Kansas City, Missouri, recently completed a “major 
survey” of Chinese archaeology. He noted that if a bilateral agreement blocking Chinese cultural 
property were implemented, the only real losers would be the American people, due to their lost 
opportunity to understand and appreciate Chinese culture. He was quoted as saying that the request 
“will not save a single chopstick,” and would be equivalent to a McCarthy-era restriction. Id. He also 
argued that construction and development are more destructive than the looters. Id. 
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continually existing civilization on Earth, with about five thousand years 
of art, culture, architecture, and politics. If China loses its heritage to 
pillage, mankind loses a magnificent and irreplaceable insight into the 
development of civilization. And therein lies the answer to the question 
posed. Mankind benefits from the protection of cultural property. Every 
nation must strive to confront pillage head on. For if we fail to stand 
together and issue a united front against the looting of ancient sites, our 
shared past will simply continue its flow along the path of least resistance.  
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